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OF MICE AND MEN 
I would like to focus on little more than a moment: a dog is led away, 
an old man remains sadly contemplative in his bunk, the cards are laid for 
a game meant to distract and not to entertain, and, finally, a shot resounds 
breaking the strained silence. The scene to which I am referring is, in 
essence, one of many of similar ilk contained in John Steinbeck’s play in 
book form, Of Mice and Men (1937). Though it is necessarily terse (just 
under a page in the Penguin edition), this episode lends itself 
conveniently to a fuller understanding of how Steinbeck wants his reader 
to be, as he remarked to interviewer Nathaniel Benchley, “so involved 
that it will be his story” (Benchley 185). This is not an uncommon 
concern among writers who wish to retain readers. What makes 
Steinbeck’s seemingly unoriginal desire apropos particularly, however, is 
that it springs from the womb of non-teleological thinking: a political-
philosophy celebrating the virtues of “is” thinking nurtured since his 
wine-drinking days with soul mate Ed Ricketts. 
To “is” think, which is to perceive blamelessly, is to surrender making 
judgments based on worldly, relative, and arguably superficial values. As 
a mantra political for its denial of unmistakably institutional values and 
philosophical for its admittedly abstruse and contradictory dimensions, 
non-teleological thinking begs, in part, the reconsideration of human 
inter-relationships. Contexts of community as a goal distinct from the lure 
of exclusive individuality and, hence, isolation become not serendipitous 
niceties, but coveted necessities essential for one’s holistic well-being. As 
Crooks sums it up ten or so pages after the “moment” in question, “[a] 
guy goes nuts if he ain’t got nobody. [...] I tell ya a guy gets too lonely an’ 
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he gets sick” (72–73). While the “moment” takes place in the very 
bunkhouse whose occupants—huddled together against the darkness of 
the night—exclude Crooks, the loneliness is no less profound. It is, in 
fact, compounded by the irony of greater numbers versus the singleness 
of the black stable hand. Steinbeck’s iteration of the loneliness concern, to 
be sure, is prodigious in Of Mice and Men as, indeed, it is in his corpus of 
work; yet, surprisingly little focus has been afforded to Steinbeck’s 
unique and, I think, endearing non-teleological remedy. A fundamental 
grasp of what I will call Steinbeck’s agapic invitation (one toward 
communities based on unconditional love) can be found by examining the 
significance of a “moment” with emphasis on the presence of silence, 
giving greater depth to the admittedly legitimate, yet lacking arguments 
that such “moments” have a solely structural function as opposed to a 
humanitarian mission.1 An elucidation of the “how” of this elixir, 
however, begins by recognizing the psychological, if not spiritual 
intimacy Steinbeck wants with his reader as a means toward a less lonely 
end. 
A sad façade is being perpetuated by the inhabitants of the bunkhouse 
after Carlson exits with Candy’s dog. As a game of euchre is hastily 
thrown together so is an illusion of camaraderie quickly manufactured in 
an undeniable attempt to find solace from the imagined goings-on of 
Carlson without and the desperate goings-on of Candy within. Many 
scholars describe the characters’ reaction to Candy’s despair as a reaction 
typical of the “Cain” syndrome—that is, the bunkhouse-mates choose not 
to be Candy’s “keeper” in fear of certain social ramifications including 
ostracism or, in this case, a rebuke from either Slim or Carlson who place 
how bad the dog smells over how much the dog means to the “old 
swamper” (18). Characterizing those social ramifications as the inevitable 
projections of “an evil social system” (IX), for example, Joseph Henry 
Jackson alludes to the sadly unspoken and, in truth, flawed mores 
dictating the rules of human inter-action. There is, he suggests, a force 
                                                 
1 “Agapic” comes from the Christian term “agape,” which means spiritual and selfless 
love. While I focus on the “moment” involving the death of Candy’ s dog as an 
invitation (albeit not taken) to engage in this type of love, a more pronounced 
invitation comes in Steinbeck’s more popular novel The Grapes of Wrath (1939) when 
Rose of Sharon invites the emaciated man in the final chapter to nourish himself with 
her mother’s milk. The “moment” in Of Mice and Men, however, aims the invitation 
more toward the reader, thereby making the realization of such an ideal interactive and, 
therefore, I think, potentially more powerful. 
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that eludes articulation yet influences nonetheless how each participant 
(here, used ironically) in the scene is supposed to act: removed, apathetic, 
and unfeeling. The term “social system,” while not qualified beyond its 
use or contextualized and, therefore, validated by a more ostensible public 
phenomenon, can easily be juxtaposed to the “Cain” syndrome. For this, 
in any case, Jackson’s insights remain relevant. 
Viewed more for its “mythic and allegorical implications” (Goldhurst 
126), however, Of Mice and Men and, in a stricter sense, the scene in 
question garners a greater potential in terms of explaining the callous 
reaction had by the bunkhouse-mates to Candy’s obvious bereavement. 
Between man as “a solitary wanderer on the face of the earth” (Goldhurst 
126), which is a direct reference to the fate of Cain after he murders his 
brother, and man saved by the choice to love rather than vindicate, the 
“moment” demonstrates clearly the tragic repetition of an archetype that 
is irrevocably intertwined in the cultural fabric of, at least, 1930s 
America.2 Each man is alone with his thoughts as evidenced by the 
crippled conversation. Slim, for example, is the first to share what is 
really not on his mind: “Slim said loudly, ‘One of my lead mules got a 
bad hoof. Got to get some tar on it’” (48). The comment remains unheard, 
and, beyond that, the lack of action (or even words) on behalf of Candy is 
indicative enough of precisely what ethics—Cain’s or Abel’s—the 
bunkhouse-men choose. The undeniable gravity that has caused the 
otherwise jovial atmosphere to wilt, however, denotes something that 
inhibits the easy classification of “Cain.” In other words, in their taciturn 
response, there is a sense of guilt. Where they are inactive, there is the 
impulse to react. The suspense is undoubtedly present, implying strongly 
a subdued will to come to the assistance of Candy. Were it not for the 
hold “Cain” values had on a sub-culture described by Slim as one where 
“ever’body in the whole damn world is scared of each other” (35), the 
“moment” might have had a different outcome. 
Steinbeck is not unmindful of the inclined outcome, though he does 
present an opportunity that flies in the face of damaging individualism. In 
                                                 
2 I would argue that the “Cain” syndrome becomes exacerbated after World War Two, 
especially in a Cold War America striving to create a distinction between itself—a 
nation that celebrates individuality—and Soviet Russia—in theory, a nation whose 
ideals are based on the virtues of the group. Nonetheless, 1930s America, with the 
admittedly dog-eat-dog mechanism in place as a means to survive, was a fertile ground 
for “Cain” ethics. To be sure, Depression America provided much fodder for the cult 
of “me” thinking after the war. 
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the course of the “moment,” “silent” or “silence” is repeated seven times. 
It was “silent,” for example, “outside” (48) immediately after Carlson left 
the bunkhouse. The “silence came into the room,” and “the silence lasted” 
(48). Throughout the “moment,” in fact, “silence” fell and “silence” kept 
invading the room. The incessant presence of silence is precisely 
Steinbeck’s imploration to the reader to fill in that silence. To put it 
another way, Steinbeck affords his readers a unique opportunity to deny 
Cain values. This explains the subdued impulse, the common guilt, the 
practically tangible hesitation discoloring the social atmosphere of the 
bunkhouse. The “moment” is undeniably poignant; emotional buttons are 
deliberately being pushed and, I think it is fair to say that the reader is 
aware of this. The reader, to be sure, willingly follows Steinbeck on a 
brief emotional ride, knowing that the result will, to borrow a trite phrase, 
tug on the heartstrings. It could even be argued that the reader relishes 
this experience; however, the desired effect goes beyond mere pathos. 
Steinbeck’s gift is not merely his ability to evoke emotion but, beyond 
that, the presentation of a choice to the reader vicariously through the 
experiences of the bunkhouse-men.3  
To view the “moment” as an opportunity requires, first, the assumption 
that there are core human values. Steinbeck, in fact, has been both lauded 
and panned for his insistence that such values exist and that they are not 
necessarily relative—that is, they are not always malleable to suit 
whatever social or political dictate. In regards to the “moment” with 
specific attention given to the presence of “silence,” Steinbeck’s concept 
of non-teleological thinking can come into play in only one manner. The 
“is” political-philosophy seeks to repudiate norms that, in essence, place 
barriers between people. In the context of the “moment,” the barriers are 
exactly those that keep people from acting on Candy’s behalf. To “is” 
think is to perceive without considering cause and effect, which is to say 
social backlash, and, therefore, it is to perceive without judgment. There 
is not the factoring in of the past; there is no fear of negative reaction. 
What “is,” accordingly, is what is present.  
It is true that the political-philosophy is an ideal and, as such, wide 
open to criticism. Accusations abound in Steinbeck criticism that label 
this political-philosophy and, in turn, Steinbeck himself as hokey, 
artistically weak, and, as Arthur Mizener even states, “sentimental” (44). 
                                                 
3 See East of Eden (1952) and Steinbeck’ s appropriation of the Hebrew word timshel, 
which means “thou mayest.” 
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Of course, this is all to say that non-teleological thinking has been 
perceived by many as a detriment to Steinbeck’s craft. To discard the 
skepticism that people can form communities outside of socially imposed 
values as, for instance, the bunkhouse-men are privy to, and embrace the 
possibility, though it be brief, of utopian social constructs where the 
participants forget temporarily what social dictates they are supposed to 
do and, instead, do what is in the emotional and psychological best 
interest of one of their brethren, however, is to take a leap from the 
comfort of objective methods of analysis to the more ineffable context of 
subjective understanding. Dare I say that if the academic community 
cannot do this (I include myself, of course) then the academic community 
still lacks the proper tools to discuss the human experience through 
literature. In any case, Steinbeck’s vision deserves careful consideration if 
not for its truly beautiful appeal to a greater potential in humankind but 
also for its ability to repudiate that which restricts the fullest expression of 
the human spirit. Though it be sentimental to some, it is, nonetheless, 
significant in terms of comprehending and, perhaps, altering a continually 
evolving social system.  
With the bunkhouse-men, their fate is sealed when they succumb to 
social pressures, which, of course, are precisely those Cain values in 
question. William Goldhurst even goes so far as to classify the outcome 
of the moment as a perpetuation of what he calls “Man Alone” (128). As 
do other critics, he suggests that this fate is predicated upon the actions of 
the Cain figure who, in many ways, is a dominating figure in “the modern 
world” (128). The “moment,” in this sense, emerges as a microcosm: an 
isolated example of not only what happens daily but also what is typically 
deemed as given in modern society. Cain will more often than not “kill” 
his brother. Though it be a “moment,” it is representative and, therefore, a 
part of the norm. There is no surprise; rather, there is only the sad 
fulfillment of a socially endorsed role. The reasons that this role is so 
dominant are many and deserve mention before an understanding of 
Steinbeck’s agapic invitation through the presence of silence can take 
place. 
To explain fully the foothold Cain values have on society in general 
and on the bunkhouse-men in specific would be to go beyond the scope of 
analysis of a “moment.” The task is simply too ponderous, necessitating a 
thorough explication of the tendencies of human nature. Instead, it 
suffices to accept the fact that human beings are products of their own 
design for better or worse. In the course of human history, contributions 
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good and bad are made that direct the flow of ideological evolution, and 
we are left, constantly it seems, to celebrate our advances or pick up the 
pieces. The reasons people injure other people are, indeed, nebulous, for 
doing so only precipitates a profound loneliness the likes of which have 
been demonstrated by the archetypal Biblical Cain as well as by the 
bunkhouse-men who go so far as to “gratefully” (49) look to the sound of 
gnawing as a means to escape their own solitude: “Sounds like there was 
a rat under there.” said George. “We ought to get a trap down there” (49). 
It is a hollow comment, eliciting no response and demonstrating the 
lengths a person will go in order to deny compassionate—need I say—
agapic impulses. Each person, to be sure, is a victim conditioned to resist 
relationships that are formed unabashedly from the start out of 
compassion and understanding and not out of the conventions that decide 
how one man (and here I am being gender specific) is to view another 
man. As with the true Cain, the initial fear of rejection by the “father,” 
which is to say the dominant norm, supersedes even the consideration that 
the effect of conformity—spiritual isolation—is much worse. The 
solution, in this sense, seems to be obvious, though deduced in retrospect; 
yet, the initiative needed to change a persistent fate is left, as Steinbeck 
presents it, to the reader: the unwitting participant in a bunkhouse drama. 
Steinbeck is sharing authorship with the reader by appealing to the 
reader to fill the silence. It is a subtle foist, banking on the non-
teleological tenet that forming relationships unpolluted with judgment is 
not only a nice thing to do but, beyond an end that, to be fair, might only 
deserve accusations of sentimentality, is essential to survival. Of course, 
the word “survival,” here, does not rest within the fact that a person can 
live with only shelter and sustenance but moves to, I think, a more 
realistic context that people, simply, need the affections of other people. It 
is the difference between humans as machines and humans as complex 
animals, and it is a difference that must be recognized as valid and not, as 
functionalists would have it, mawkish. Thus, by surrendering the pencil 
during the “moment,” Steinbeck entrusts the responsibility of arriving at a 
context of community based on brotherly love to a reader who has the 
curious advantage of peering inward at an inclusive situation in the sense 
that it is a common social model. This vantage point only serves to 
emphasize the absurdity of choosing, as the bunkhouse-men do, Cain 
values, for as the drama unfolds, the reader actually witnesses the 
undesirable consequences. In this light, the act of filling the “silence” is 
itself an act of creating in the same sense that Steinbeck himself is 
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creating. There is co-authorship, which is to say that the reader 
“participate[s] in authorship in a way that is more than simply yielding to 
it. It must be grounded in enactments of the authorial attempt to give way 
to the new” (Crosswhite 101). The new or that which is against an old and 
destructive social paradigm is precisely at the heart of a political-
philosophy geared toward re-evaluating for the purpose of repudiating 
anti-social values.  
There is an assumption being made when Steinbeck passes the baton of 
authorship to the reader. It is an assumption based on the premise that, 
inherently, human beings will opt for that which benefits them. This is not 
to say that people will not sometimes succumb to that which harms them 
as exemplified clearly in the “moment”; however, it is to suggest that 
people have, if you will, built in needs that go expressly beyond socially 
imposed “needs” as in the “need” to sport the latest fashion or the “need” 
to fit into a role in order to avoid ridicule. Steinbeck’s sense of “need” 
transcends those constructed by society. For him, the ultimate need is the 
need for human beings to commune with one another beyond the 
strictures of whatever social expectation, for doing so will facilitate the 
expression of a greater human potential. It is the practice of “acceptance-
understanding” where one is regarded zen-like as “is.”4 Conventional 
social codes of conduct are disregarded. What are nurtured in their place 
are codes based on common welfare: human inter-relationships couched 
in fundamental and undeniable truths in terms of what else beyond the 
material is essential for human happiness. Steinbeck’s kinship with, most 
directly, the Transcendentalists is striking, adding validity to a political-
philosophy that otherwise receives negative criticism for its utopian 
quality. No doubt, this is an ideal, but, I think, it is a bold ideal in how it 
directly challenges the Cain social epidemic exacerbated by the dog-eat-
dog virtues of an industrialized world. The “moment,” in this respect, 
might even be viewed as the raw result of a world that fosters alienation 
to lengths not before seen. The primeval Cain had been ushered into the 
twentieth century by riding upon the back of a mechanized steed, and the 
effects were indubitably permeative. 
                                                 
4 See Steinbeck’s The Log from the Sea Of Cortez (1951) for a detailed explanation of 
“acceptance-understanding” through non-teleological thinking. Although Steinbeck 
does not explicitly juxtapose non-teleological thinking with Eastern philosophy, the 
similarities are evident, thereby adding strength to the argument that Steinbeck’s form 
of social protest has a deeply spiritual base. 
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Norman N. Holland in “Where is a Text?: A Neurological View” states 
plainly that “[w]hat you know of a text is simply the sum of your 
perceptions” (21). If this is the case, then a text has as many meanings as 
the number of readers who encounter that text. As complexly composed 
as each reader is, so is there the possibility that their interpretations will 
be equally complex and, more importantly, individual in nature. 
Certainly, this is what gives a literary work its value: the more well-
founded interpretations a work gathers, the better it is. The pathos evoked 
by the “moment,” accordingly, would be a pathos as unique as the reader; 
no one feeling would truly be the same. What must be considered, 
however, before reaching this type of conclusion is the surreptitious 
influence popular social dictates have on one’s interpretive process. This 
is to suggest that, while what one arrives at is, indeed, personal (though 
this itself deserves further qualification), it is as well colored by various 
social and, more importantly institutionalized hegemonies. Holland later 
introduces an intriguing insight as it relates to the perception of a text. He 
asks, “Why? Why do we describe—even sense—the world as “out there,” 
in a not-me when patently the only way it occurs to us, in us, is as 
electrochemical pulses, action potentials, in our neurons, in me?” (23). To 
Holland, the outer world is comparatively trivial, for, ultimately, it is the 
inner, socialized world that decides the “how” of perception. Beyond the 
distinction between individual judge and, as he puts it, “not-me,” he 
contends that knowledge of the world is intimately derived—a decisively 
internal process where the outer can only be understood as it relates to the 
inner. This is an intrepid statement of the process of perception because it 
centers the world around the ego. 
In this sense, I see both an element of truth, which contributes to my 
own argument for why and how one would be inclined to fill the 
“silence,” and a point of contestation, for we are largely not masters of 
those ideologies that orbit us and, thus, we are in no position to say that 
“not-me” is, at least, secondary in rank. The inner-self is influenced 
heavily by the “not-me” or outer world. This is done so regularly, in fact, 
that the very implements the inner-self uses in order to negotiate the 
constant barrage of external stimuli are themselves externally derived. 
Our methods of understanding are constructed, not innate. This, however, 
is only to the extent that ideologies are imposed, which is to say that it 
only goes so far as the ability of social values to infiltrate one’s psyche. 
Though the ability is, without a doubt, great, there is, I think, a potentially 
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more influential force that emerges from more primal (which is not to say 
“savage”) impulses. 
In relation to the “moment,” an explanation of one’s primal impulses 
as opposed to one’s socially dictated impulses requires an understanding 
of Steinbeck’s concept of the “phalanx” or “group-man.” The “phalanx,” 
simply, is a metaphor derived from ancient Roman military tactics where 
individual soldiers unite in order to facilitate the realization of some goal. 
In the actual sense, a Roman phalanx was a four-sided unit able to protect 
its members and go on the offensive simultaneously. The tactic was 
without a doubt efficient and effective as the Roman army proved time 
and again to be a lethal fighting force. Like a school of fish or a herd of 
animals, the “phalanx” worked off of primarily one principle: there is 
strength in numbers. At the same time, the individual who is a part of the 
phalanx is, to an extent, empowered because there is built into the “group-
man” the element of protection and, from that, freedom from worry. This 
is to say that the interests of the individual are best served by the advent 
of the group. It is a complementary relationship like, I might imagine, any 
good relationship where individuality grows within the context of the 
group. While the actual phalanx was held together for the common 
purpose of vanquishing an enemy, Steinbeck’s metaphorical “phalanx” 
appeals to a more humanitarian goal. It is not aggression, per se, that 
binds Steinbeck’s “group-man” but rather the common necessity of love. 
Some critics are overly wary of inter-human relationships grounded 
solely in affection. There is the unfortunate tendency, in fact, to charac-
terize such relationships as inherently problematic. Some critics even 
push the envelope by implying that such relationships are morally ques-
tionable. Robert Cardullo, for example, wagers that George’s attachment 
to Lennie is “unnatural” (3), suggesting that the love between the two 
men is homosexual in nature. Accordingly, the human connection be-
tween the two bindlestiffs is sexually motivated; indeed, George’s 
elusiveness when asked to explain the reasons why he and Lennie travel 
together makes sense, at least, within the framework of this analytical 
lens. When Cardullo asserts further that George’s “unnatural” love for his 
compatriot functions as a way to “put up with one such as Lennie” (2–3) 
in that George somehow needs to feel sexually attracted toward Lennie in 
order to justify their relationship, an egregious line of logic is being 
perpetuated. What is being presupposed in this reasoning is that, beyond 
the possibility of there being an enlightened form to their relationship, 
their relationship is one ultimately centered around function. In other 
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words, there is no cohesion between George and Lennie beyond that 
which is provided by impersonal necessity. Theirs is an arrangement and 
not a friendship. The demands of an existence where, oftentimes, George 
and Lennie “ain’t got any” (11) ketchup both metaphorically and literally 
has warranted the formation of a partnership where practical concerns can 
be addressed. Cardullo’s supposition, perhaps, is one that, at least, credits 
George for seeking ways to emerge from the cold confines of a 
relationship based solely on usefulness; nonetheless, the basis of his 
position fails to consider a fundamental dimension of Steinbeck’s art. 
Although the ranch boss echoes the suspicion that George may be 
“takin’ his [Lennie’s] pay away from him” (22), adding validity to any 
argument that George and Lennie’s relationship is purely one grounded in 
practicality, such an argument can quickly be dismissed by George’s 
response: 
“No, ‘course I ain’t. Why ya think I’m sellin’ him out?” 
“Well, I never seen one guy take so much trouble for another guy. I 
just like to know what your interest is.” 
George said, “He’s my … cousin. I told his old lady I’d take care of 
him. He got kicked in the head by a horse when he was a kid. He’s 
awright. Just ain’t bright. But he can do anything you tell him.” (22) 
Of course, George admits later that the story about Lennie being 
kicked in the head by a horse was completely made up. This might be an 
irrelevant but amusing detail—an ornamental tidbit, perhaps—if it were 
not for the fact that George never actually articulates clearly the reasons 
why he looks after Lennie. The question simply evaporates as the plots 
heats up. Knowing something about the ideal Steinbeck seeks to express, 
however, equips the perceptive reader with the tools to answer the 
question nonetheless. 
George “take(s) so much trouble” for Lennie because he loves him. It 
is not a love of convenience where he loves more so the thought of not 
being alone and not Lennie per se, and it is most certainly not a homo-
sexual love, which, as far as I am concerned, is absurdly reductionistic not 
to mention politically obsequious. As a two-person exemplification of the 
“phalanx,” George and Lennie have a love where the individual grows 
and is nurtured under the auspices of the group. They are the ideal 
complement. It is interesting that any characterization of this type of 
relationship is beyond the breadth of George’s vocabulary as well as it is 
beyond the comprehension of the ranch boss. Neither can justify in 
spoken language the need for or the nature of an agapic relationship, 
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although George, at least, intuits that such a relationship is worth 
defending. An honest question is answered with an off-the-cuff lie and, 
the Truth (that being the bond between two people which renders words 
futile) remains hidden in yet another contrivance of man. 
It is important to reiterate the true core of George and Lennie’s rela-
tionship because it provides a premise for understanding the “moment.” 
Agapic love is a powerful agent in Steinbeck’s fiction not because of its 
ability, as some would have it, to jerk tears but for its ability to repudiate 
deftly manners of human inter-relationships that emanate from social 
mandates. Most obviously, the social mandate in Of Mice and Men is one 
advanced by the Great Depression, albeit it certainly did not begin with 
the infamous Wall Street crash of 1929. The primary Cain value of 
selfishness only found a more fertile ground from which to grow during 
the 1930s, and it was Steinbeck’s noble charge, it seems, to remind 
America that truly decent relationships are not built upon distrust and 
resentment but, rather, upon reciprocated compassion. If this is hokey 
then the accuser is a victim conditioned to believe that agapic rela-
tionships are valueless in the grand scheme of an advancing society. On 
the contrary and as Steinbeck would have it, agapic relationships are the 
cornerstones of great societies because they simply address basic human 
needs before other needs as directed by whatever social movement are 
even considered. Steinbeck’s was an almost impossible task toward 
profound ends. 
The reader witnesses Steinbeck’s “phalanx” in the agapic relationship 
between George and Lennie. Steinbeck begins early in the novella, in fact, 
when the two companions dream in unison and, in doing so, reveal that a 
hallmark of an agapic relationship such as Steinbeck presents it is the 
open recognition that agapic feelings exist:  
Lennie was delighted. “That’s it—that’s it. Now tell how it is with 
us.”  
George went on. “With us it ain’t like that. We got a future. We got 
somebody to talk to that gives a damn about us. We don’t have to sit in 
no bar room blowin’ in our jack jus’ because we got no place else to go. 
If them other guys gets in jail they can rot for all anybody gives a damn. 
But not us.” 
Lennie broke in. “But not us! An’ why? Because… because I got you 
to look after me, and you got me to look after you, and that’s why.” (14) 
The passage is famous. The conversation, worn to each of them like a 
favorite sweater, exposes the quintessence of their camaraderie. It is as 
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basic to their well-being as it is complex in light of sundry pejorative 
social mores whose subscribers would readily brand such a relationship as 
bizarre, yet what is noteworthy particularly about this prescribed 
exchange is that it is public, meaning that it is openly admitted. There is 
no secret between George and Lennie about how they feel about each 
other. There is simply agape: Steinbeck’s “group-man” ideal exemplified 
in the smallest group possible. 
A common functionalist argument for George and Lennie’s relation-
ship being the way that it is—endearing, perhaps even touching—would 
be that it sets the stage for an ironic ending. The killing of Candy’s dog, 
accordingly, is seen as foreshadowing: a useful literary device to show, in 
this case, the sometimes tragic discrepancy between the demands of an 
oftentimes unforgiving society and the tender bonds of love. It is easy to 
see the appeal of this situation. What surfaces by juxtaposing the 
“moment” with the cataclysmic end scene in such a clinical manner, 
however, is a stilted analysis that ignores the fact that the very nature of 
George and Lennie’s relationship is, in and of itself, important. Any 
qualification that the relationship is less than essential to understanding 
Steinbeck’s humanitarian mission is, thus, frustratingly dismissive. No 
doubt, the novella’s conclusion is ironic, yet I contend that the irony long 
precedes the abrupt ending. Beyond the clinical irony of George’s 
introduction of a bullet to Lennie’s head, there is an irony encapsulated in 
a “moment,” which addresses adroitly issues that are common to both 
characters and the reader alike. Recognizing the “moment” as a double-
bladed sword wielded by Steinbeck as a means to foreground the problem 
of the “Cain” hegemony against the backdrop of a fiction and to do this 
for readers themselves very much enmeshed in those values, in fact, 
necessarily broadens an approach to any thought-to-be textbook literary 
device. Simply, more can be gleaned from the “moment” by understand-
ing that much of what the “moment” means is derived through participat-
ing in it. The reader is as much a part of the semantic of the story as the 
characters. 
As an example of the “group-man” ideal, George and Lennie’s 
“unusual buddyship” (Bellman 26) becomes a point of reference 
throughout the novella. All other situations are judged according to the 
criteria set by two men who have somehow transcended the predominant 
Cain morality of the world and, instead, defensively situated themselves 
in the context of a yet-to-be-realized dream: “a little house an’ a room to 
ourself. Little fat iron stove, an’ in the winter we’d keep a fire goin’ in it” 
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(58). The fact that the pair is composed of opposites—one, large and 
brutish and the other small and quick—further demonstrates that a 
“phalanx” can successfully emerge out of contrary components. Although 
an argument certainly exists that such an ideal “suggests the futility of the 
all-too-human attempt to recapture Eden” (Goldhurst 135) where George 
and Lennie are merely naïve dreamers wishing to reverse the degenerative 
direction of humankind, at least, among themselves, the fact of the matter 
is that, above every other relationship in the novella (Curly and his wife, 
Curly and Slim, everybody and Crooks), theirs is a relationship that 
strives toward perfect goodness. By contrast, the Cain values that allow 
the outcome of the “moment” to occur are those that are socially 
debilitating. There is no redeeming quality; rather, what surfaces is an 
example of how not to regard a fellow human being. 
As such, it is precisely in the interchange between the “moment” and 
the reader where Steinbeck’s tacitly delivered agapic invitation occurs. It 
is a deduction that draws upon comparison. Witnessing the ineffable bond 
between George and Lennie then experiencing the “silence” of a moment 
in lieu of witnessing the bunkhouse-men come to the assistance of an old 
man reluctant to part with his canine companion can lead to only one 
conclusion beyond the functionalistic notion that the death of Candy’ s 
dog is merely a foreshadowing device. Choosing to love one another in 
the agapic sense of the word is not only away to reject popular, yet 
destructive standards, but it is the only way to preserve the possibility of 
utopian communities. The realization of this context is the quintessence of 
Steinbeck’s vision, and to repudiate it or deem it to be merely 
“sentimental” would be to grossly overlook Steinbeck’s humanitarian 
mission. 
Peter Smagorinsky remarks in “If Meaning Is Constructed, What Is It 
Made From?: Toward a Cultural Theory of Reading” that “ [r]eading is 
[…] a constructive act done in conjunction with mediating texts and the 
cultural-historical context in which reading takes place” (137). Self-
evident to most though it may be, this is a truth that, in fact, evolves as the 
cultural-historical context occupied by the reader inevitably evolves. In 
other words, a reading of a text metamorphoses with the accumulation of 
time no matter if it is done by the same reader. Interpretation and the 
context from which an interpretation takes place is an ever-changing 
phenomenon. The “silence” that is filled in the “moment” as a means for 
the reader and Candy to form, if you will, a surrogate agapic relationship 
in the image of George and Lennie in reaction to the lack of words or 
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actions from the bunkhouse-men is filled with successively different 
intuitive materials. A reader of Of Mice and Men upon its 1937 publica-
tion would have responded differently than a reader of today. While 
simple-sounding, this is an important facet in understanding the 
importance of an agapic invitation to a present-day audience. 
As the curse of Cain has mutated since the end of World War Two and 
the inception of a society whose values are relative if not based on 
capitalistic struggle altogether (and here, I speak from the perspective of a 
classic Marxist), so does the “silence” in the “moment” grow more 
deafening.5 The need to participate in an agapic relationship in the way 
that George and Lennie participate in each other is greater in the present 
than it was a few short decades ago, and it will be greater still in the 
future given the relentless momentum of “progress.” This is the value of a 
“moment” concerning an old man, a dog, and a small group whose 
members tragically choose to refrain rather than to react because of what 
society mandates as right. In this light, the social worth of Of Mice and 
Men, in general, and the “moment,” in specific, grows exponentially. 
Steinbeck’s subtle imploration cunningly keeps pace with society’s 
machinations on the human spirit, yet the responsibility of the first step 
toward communion still remains, as it always has, with the reader. It is, 
first, to see the example that Steinbeck provides in George and Lennie, 
and then it is to seek to replicate it by participating in the text according to 
Steinbeck’s agapic vision. The old man suffers under the weight of the 
silence, and the dog unwaringly receives its fate, but the message is 
ultimately not one that privileges passivity: a laissez-faire approach to the 
darker times of life. Steinbeck demands a stronger regard for human 
suffering. In truth, Steinbeck’s is an appeal to reject Cain values in place 
of love and compassion, for only by those values can there be holistic 
well-being. In a phrase, this constitutes the core of Steinbeck’s humanism. 
Before any realization of agape can occur, there is initially the 
consideration of choices. In terms of the “moment,” the reader sees what 
route was chosen and, hence, sees the outcome as it affects the characters 
involved. Without a doubt, Steinbeck intends for the reader to witness the 
results of a poor choice as a means, I would argue, to edify. Because the 
responsibility of authorship is, in part, surrendered by Steinbeck, how-
                                                 
5 Of course, this is in reference to the ideological decay that was a part of the postmodern 
experience. The idea that Cain values have only been exacerbated as a result of this 
facet is not difficult to discern under this lens. 
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ever, the reader is presented with an opportunity to demonstrate what can 
be learned by, at least in a meta-textual sense, filling the “silence” in a 
manner that bolsters corn passion. Like the characters, the reader is 
presented with an agapic invitation. Steinbeck’s desired response from the 
reader is obvious and, in light of the evident trend of Cain values today, 
necessary, yet the actual decision resides nonetheless within the 
individual conscience where occurs the battle between social mandates 
and spiritual imperatives. Interactive though the “moment” may be, what 
meaning is derived comes from precisely how the conflict is understood; 
however, given the nature of Cain values to be infectious, what once may 
have depended may, in the more “modern” future, depend no longer. 
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